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The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the
NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is
that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized.
It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of
consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus
propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The main theoret-
ical idea that emerges as a consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate
of a perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between content-processing and
consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper elaborates this distinction, marshals some ini-
tial arguments in its favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of consciousness.
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This article is part of a special issue on “The Neural Correlates of Consciousness”,
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1 Introduction
The last two decades have brought an avalanche of empirical studies of the neural
correlates of consciousness (NCCs). Important new findings are reported almost
on a daily basis (for good overviews of recent developments see Koch et al., 2016;
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Förster et al., 2020; Michel & Morales, 2020; Tsuchiya et al., 2015). Parallel to this
burgeoning research programme runs a string of methodological and conceptual
studies that are informed by this programme and strive to make its central no-
tions precise and its methods more fruitful. To name just the most influential of
them, Chalmers (2000) laid down the canonical definition of an NCC as the min-
imal neural system the activation of which is sufficient for conscious experience,
and addressed a number of important methodological issues of the NCC studies.
Miller (2015) highlighted the distinction between correlation and constitution in
NCC studies and pointed out the limitations of the framework of minimally suf-
ficient NCCs. Hohwy (2009) emphasized the differences between content- and
level-based approaches to NCC research. Bayne et al. (2016) found the traditional
unidimensional level-based approaches to consciousness untenable and sketched
a multidimensional account of global states of consciousness. Aru, Bachmann, et
al. (2012) urged the need to distinguish the prerequisites and consequences of con-
scious perception from the NCC proper. Finally, Haynes (2009) and Sandberg et al.
(2014) argued for investigating the NCCs with multivariate decoding of neural ac-
tivity patterns. This method, they claim, may establish a tight link between types
of conscious experiences and neural processing in distributed brain locations.
The present paperwaswritten as a contribution to this ongoingmethodological
debatewithin the NCC project. The notion of NCC is equally applied in research on
levels of consciousness (more precisely called “global states of consciousness”) and
in the studies of contentful conscious mental states (Hohwy, 2009). In the research
on levels of consciousness, attempts are made to identify the neural underpinnings
of various levels of consciousness such as being alert, dreaming, or being in a
minimal conscious state (but see McKilliam (2020), this volume). The other main
usage of the NCC concept concerns neural processes correlating with conscious
mental states, especially with conscious perceptual states such as seeing a bright
sunset. Our focus in this paper is entirely on the neural correlates in this latter
sense. We are interested in the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes
that come and go when the level of consciousness remains more or less constant.
Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual states,
needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the per-
ceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms
making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose, in section 2 of the
paper, that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The
first subnotion covers the content-specific side of the perceptual NCC. This subno-
tion harbors some of the most vexing puzzles of consciousness science concerning
the nature and material realization of consciously perceived contents. The central
topic of this paper, though, is the second subnotion, that of the neural process
or processes making the perceptual contents, clustered in a perceptual state, con-
scious.
The division of the perceptual NCC into the two subnotions is not a priori
but inspired and informed by perceptual NCC research. That being said, not ev-
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ery theorist of consciousness will endorse the reconceptualization we propose. In
section 3 we selectively review the theories of consciousness that we believe are
supporting the division as well as those that do not sit easily with it. Section 4
puts forward two central arguments for endorsing the division. The section fur-
ther motivates the idea that from the neural point of view, an episode of conscious
perception arises in the neural interaction between the content-processing and
consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The concluding section 5 sketches some
advantages of the proposed reconceptualization.
2 Distilling the general neural correlate of percep-
tual consciousness from the neural correlates of
perceptual contents
Applied to episodes of conscious perception, the concept of NCC typically con-
cerns neural processes systematically correlating with a particular type of percep-
tual experience. That is to say, the perceptual NCC is typically a content-specific
correlate. We may speak of the NCC of seeing a face or the NCC of the smell of a
rose.
The centrality of this content-specific NCC concept can be illustrated by numer-
ous examples. For instance, Crick (1994, p. 9) speaks about the neural correlate
of seeing red. The same emphasis on content-specificity is present in the follow-
ing formulations: “a neural correlate of consciousness is a specific pattern of brain
activity that correlates with particular conscious experiences” (Rees et al., 2002, p.
261); “the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms jointly sufficient for a
specific conscious percept” (Koch, 2004, p. 16); “content-specific NCC are the neu-
ral mechanisms specifying particular phenomenal contents within consciousness,
such as colors, faces, places, or thoughts” (Boly et al., 2017, p. 9604; see also Koch
et al., 2016, p. 308; Aru, Bachmann, et al., 2012, p. 738). Even one of Chalmers’
two famous definitions of NCC, commonly accepted in the field as the definitions
of NCC, targets content-specific mechanisms expressing the particular types of
conscious percepts: “an NCC (for content) is a minimal neural representational
system N such that representation of a content in N is sufficient, under conditions
C, for representation of that content in consciousness” (Chalmers, 2000, p. 31).
Because the notion of NCC is also used by researchers working on levels of con-
sciousness, it would be desirable to have a specific label for the content-specific per-
ceptual NCC. Neural Correlate of conscious (perceptual) content (“NCcc” for short)
suggests itself. The NCccs for particular types of conscious perceptual states differ
in their neural details. These differences are reflected in the experienced differ-
ences between the percepts. There is an indefinite variety of NCccs, corresponding
to the variety of perceptual contents we may consciously experience. In all this
diversity, though, the search for the neural correlates of consciousness strives to
Marvan, T., & Polák, M. (2020). Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural
correlates of perceptual consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II), 5.
https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.II.61
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
Tomáš Marvan and Michal Polák 4
identify a common thread. The pivotal question of consciousness studies is what
makes any particular perceptual content conscious.
We believe that to address the pivotal question is to take seriously the possi-
bility that the NCcc is a composite. At its core are the mechanisms preparing the
contents we experience. Let us call these content mechanisms Neural Correlates of
(perceptual) content (“NCc” for short). The NCc is the part of the NCcc that is en-
tirely responsible for the differences between experienced contents – for example,
between the conscious seeing of green and the conscious seeing of blue.1 The sec-
ond part of the NCcc is the topic of this paper. It is the neural mechanism making
the perceptual contents conscious. In contrast to the ever-varying processes sub-
sumed under the NCc label, this mechanism is shared across different perceptual
NCccs. Whenever this mechanism is activated, and the content-specific process-
ing is in place, conscious perceptual states are present as well. Neural activity
correlating with a conscious perception of an apple includes both the activation
of content mechanisms presenting the visual features of an apple (NCc) and the
modality nonspecific process(es) making the bundle of content features of the ap-
ple conscious. Similarly for all other particular conscious experiences across all
sensory modalities. We may as well call such common mechanism the mechanism
of perceptual consciousness itself.
Let us label this mechanism the general Neural Correlate of (perceptual) Con-
sciousness (“gNCC” for short). This content-nonspecific, domain-general neural
process is no less important than the content-preparing mechanisms. In fact, the
search for this universal neural mechanism is arguably the ultimate goal of per-
ceptual NCC research.2 It is plausible that the science of consciousness will only
isolate the gNCC by first amassing a great deal of information about the content-
specific NCccs – both in a single sensory modality as well as across modalities. But
mere gathering of more and more content-specific data won’t do. The next step,
we submit, is to isolate the gNCC. This additional step, though, is rarely made
by consciousness theorists. On the contrary, as the definitions of the neural cor-
relates of perceptual consciousness cited above demonstrate, the NCcc is usually
1In this respect, NCc is similar to Block’s (2005, p. 47) notion of core phenomenal NCC, which in
turn was inspired by Chalmers’ core NCC (2000, p. 26). Core NCC contains the presumed core
processes correlating with experiences. Core NCC is a part of the total NCC, the overall brain
activity sufficient for any conscious perceptual episode. As the total NCC contains more neural
activity than is directly relevant for a particular perceptual episode (Bayne & Hohwy, 2013, p. 25;
Chalmers, 2000, p. 26), NCC research is predominantly focused on the core NCC.The notion of the
core NCC emphasizes the qualitative differences between manifestations of such core processes
in various conscious states. This is clear not just in Block (2005) and Chalmers (2000), but also in
other authors writing about the core NCC, such as Keaton (2015).
2For reasons of space, we restricted our attention here to perceptual contents and do not make
a parallel case for other types of experiential contents. However, we suppose that the idea of a
gNCC could be extended to other types of phenomenal states, such as emotions, thoughts, meta-
cognition, dreams, working-memory contents etc. All conscious experiences, whether perceptual,
cognitive, or affective, could share the same type of the gNCC mechanism (implemented in differ-
ent parts of the brain).
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pictured as an undifferentiated whole in which content mechanisms are fused with
consciousness conferring mechanism.
The gNCC notion will hopefully become more perspicuous when compared
with two somewhat related notions. The first is what Koch et al. (Koch et al., 2016)
call full NCC. The full NCC is located in the “posterior Hot Zone” comprising pari-
etal, occipital and temporal areas. It is “the neural substrate supporting experience
in general, irrespective of its specific content” (Koch et al., 2016, p. 308). The term
appears to have the same meaning as gNCC. However, on closer look, the two
concepts are quite different. The full NCC is defined as a “union of the sets of
content-specific NCC for all possible contents of experience” (ibid.; see also the
same claim in Boly et al. (2017), esp. in Fig. 1 on p. 9604). The full NCC is thus
a union of all possible content-specific neural patterns, all possible NCccs. The
gNCC is not a union at all. Not being involved in the production of perceptual
contents, the gNCC does not implement representational aspects. Further, even
if the content mechanisms were all located in the posterior Hot Zone, the gNCC
might extend into other regions.
The second notion, Fink’s (2016, p. 4) “neural correlate of general conscious-
ness”, comes closer to what we have in mind. Consider the following passage:
[W]e may talk of broader and broader types, e.g., red experiences,
color experiences, visual experiences, sensory experiences, experience
while being awake, and so on. The most general correlate we may be
interested in is what distinguishes all conscious mental activity from
un- or preconscious mental activity. (Fink, 2016, p. 4)
We agree that the general correlate of consciousness is what distinguishes con-
scious from unconscious mental activity. The difference is that Fink’s idea of the
neural correlate of general consciousness seems broader than the gNCC. It seems
to involve the neural correlates of global states of consciousness, the processes dif-
ferentiating between being conscious or unconscious in the global sense. In con-
trast, the gNCC is limited to episodes of conscious perception. The mechanisms of
global states of consciousness are presupposed by the gNCC, but do not form part
of it.
In the following, we will further explore the idea that the NCcc, the minimal
neural activation sufficient for a particular type of experience (Chalmers, 2000, p.
31; Koch, 2004, p. 16), is a composite of the NCc and gNCC. More precisely, since
the spatial metaphor might be misleading, the idea is that NCccs are formed in the
neural interactions between the content- and consciousness-mechanisms. We will
continue to focus predominantly on the gNCC. So far we have been speaking only
about an abstract notion of gNCC. In the next section 3, we will introduce some
concrete proposals about how to construe the gNCC.
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Abbreviation Type of the neural correlate Description Notes
NCC Neural correlate of 
consciousness
Comes in two types: level-based 
NCC and content-based NCC. 
Level-based NCC is the neural 
underpinning of levels of 
consciousness such as being 
awake, being in a coma, or 
being anaesthetised. 
The content-based NCC is the 
minimal neural system whose 
activation is sufficient for a 
particular type of conscious 
experience (Chalmers, 2000).        
The content-based NCC as 
defined by Chalmers (2000) has 
the same extension as the NCcc 
below.
Core NCC Core neural correlate of 
consciousness
Core neural processes 
correlating with experiences.
Term introduced in Chalmers 
(2000) and further applied in 
Block (2005) and Keaton 
(2015). Core NCC equals 
content-based NCC.
NCcc Neural correlate of conscious 
(perceptual) contents
Neural correlate of a type of a 
conscious perceptual state (such 
as hearing an airplane in the 
distance)
A dynamic combination of NCc 
and gNCC
NCc Neural correlate of (perceptual) 
content
Neural mechanism/pattern 
creating the content of a 
perceptual state.
The NCc is that part of the 
neural correlate of a conscious 
perceptual state that 
distinguishes one perceptual 
content from another, e.g., the 
seeing of blue from the seeing 
of green.
gNCC General neural correlate of 
(perceptual) consciousness
Neural mechanism conferring 
consciousness on perceptual 
contents.
Free from all content-specific 
(representational) aspects. A 
somewhat related concept of the 
neural correlate of general 
consciousness can be found in 
Fink (2016).
Full NCC Full neural correlate of 
consciousness
Union of the sets of content-
specific NCC for all possible 
contents of experience; situated 
in the posterior Hot Zone.
Term introduced in Koch et al. 
(2016).
Total NCC Total neural correlate of 
consciousness
The totality of neural processes 
sufficient for a given conscious 
state.
Term introduced in Chalmers 
(2000). The total NCC includes 
the core NCC together with all 
other neurally enabling 
conditions (relegated to the 
background of the core 
processes).
1
Figure 1: Kinds of neural correlates of consciousness (The yellow fields contain the pro-
posed reconceptualization; the remaining concepts were introduced in seminal papers of
the NCC debate.)
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3 gNCC and some prominent contemporary theo-
ries of perceptual consciousness
Although the gNCC/NCc distinction does not depend on any particular theory of
consciousness, it is not formulated independently of empirical research. On the
contrary, some of the most prominent current theories of consciousness permit to
distinguish between the content-constituting mechanisms and the gNCC. In the
following, we will selectively review five examples of three types of theories of
consciousness: those that support, those that probably do not support and those
that almost certainly do not support the gNCC notion.
Prinz (2012) explicitly recommends to distinguish between these two mecha-
nisms in his attentional theory of consciousness (Attended intermediate-level rep-
resentation theory – AIR). The AIR theory’s basic claim is that phenomenal con-
sciousness arises if and only if the intermediate-level representations are modu-
lated by attention (Prinz, 2012, p. 89). The intermediate level of representations
resides in between the too detailed and pointilistic representations in the early
visual areas and the too abstract, categorial representations in the higher visual
areas. At the cellular level, the intermediate-level visual representations, the con-
tents of experience, are implemented in the pyramidal neurons within the visual
cortex. Combining population and temporal coding, Prinz coins the term “vector-
waves”. A vectorwave is a pattern of activity in a population of neurons, a pattern
with distinctive temporal dynamics. Vectorwaves implement perceptual contents:
red colour is implemented by a particular vectorwave, and so is blue or yellow
colour. For colours to become conscious, though, more is needed than just the
population’s firing in a vectorwave pattern. It is necessary that a synchronous fir-
ing of the vectorwave neurons in the gamma range (25 to 70 Hz oscillations) takes
place. Neurally, this synchronization is triggered by interneurons connected to
the visual pyramidal cells and modulating their activity by inhibitory mechanisms
(Prinz, 2012, p. 135); both pyramidal neurons and the interneurons are localized
in the same cortex area. Putting the two distinct neural processes, vectorwaves
and gamma synchronization, together, Prinz speaks about “gamma vectorwaves”.
In our terms, a gamma vectorwave is the NCcc of a particular colour experience,
and it is composed of the vectorwave fixing the perceptual content (NCc) and the
synchronous gamma oscillation (gNCC) allowing the content to become conscious.
The Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) comports with our concep-
tualization, too. The theory identifies the neural substrate of consciousness itself
with activation of the “global workspace” consisting mainly of long-distance ax-
onal connections of large pyramidal neurons in cortical layers II and III (Dehaene
& Changeux, 2011; Mashour et al., 2020; Sergent & Naccache, 2012). First, the sig-
nal travels through visual areas and is further amplified by local feedback loops.
Visual contents generated by this processing remain unconscious. Provided the
signal is sufficiently strong, it travels onwards to the prefrontal cortex. Long-
distance axons of the pyramidal neurons then secure feedback connections from
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the prefrontal cortex to lower areas, especially to associative areas in the poste-
rior parietal cortex and also all the way back to the visual areas. This “ignition”
(Dehaene et al., 2003) of the neuronal workspace results in distributed yet synchro-
nized oscillatory activity and makes the visual signals available for other modules
connected by the neuronal workspace. Such global availability, arising between
200 and 280ms after stimulus onset, marks a transition towards conscious percep-
tion. Indeed, according to the GNWT, the global availability of contents simply
is what it means for them to be perceived consciously. The sustained activation
of the neuronal workspace thus can be taken to constitute the gNCC according to
the GNWT.
The distinction between gNCC and NCc does not smoothly apply to all major
theories that currently compete to explain conscious perception, though. Lamme’s
Recurrent ProcessingTheory (RPT) is a case in point. On a straightforward reading
of RPT, visual contents are made conscious when, after the “feedforward sweep”
of visual processing, the signal is sent back from higher visual areas to lower ones.
The feedforward sweep through the hierarchy of visual areas activates the visual
content mechanisms and gives the perceptual state its particular form. During this
initial phase of activation, visual features such as orientation, contrast, colour, or
direction of motion are extracted and visual objects are categorized. But all this
happens unconsciously. It is the feedback from higher to lower areas that turns
unconscious vision into conscious seeing. Feedback from higher to lower areas
thus can be taken to be the gNCC according to the RPT.
This straightforward reading is supported by Lamme (2003, 2006). At one place
Lamme openly states that “[w]e could even define consciousness as recurrent pro-
cessing” (Lamme, 2006, p. 499). However, the story in Lamme’s more recent article
(Lamme, 2020) takes a different turn. Here Lamme attributes complex visual func-
tions to recurrent processing: the function of perceptual organization, mainly of
the figure-ground segregation, and of object integration. None of these functions
can be implemented by the feedforward sweep itself. Although recurrent process-
ing in this account remains to be tightly associated with consciousness (because
none of the complex visual functions can be realized unconsciously), it now has a
distinctly visual form. Feedback from higher to lower areas does not constitute a
content-nonspecific gNCC, but is just a final stage of visual processing. On such
a view, vision has no need for a true gNCC: visual consciousness is the automatic
outcome of the latest stages of visual processing. The content mechanisms cannot
be separated from recurrent processing because recurrent processing has a visual
representational nature, taking care of the visual figure-ground segregation and
visual object integration.
RPT in its latest form thus does not support the gNCC idea. The straightfor-
ward reading, taking recurrent processing to be the gNCC, would now be rejected
by Lamme. Still, let us try to offer an argument in its favour. In a recent inter-
modality comparison study of neural substrates of conscious perception, Auksz-
tulewicz et al. (2012) compared the neural correlates of visual and tactile percepts.
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Their presumed gNCC was recurrent cortical loops, the same gNCC as in the RPT
(on the straightforward reading). Of the three models Auksztulewicz et al. used to
interpret their data, feedforward, feedback and recurrent, the recurrent model best
fitted the somatosensory detection task data for data segments longer than 140ms.
If recurrent loops between somatosensory regions are responsible for making tac-
tile contents conscious, there is reason to suppose that recurrent processing is a
domain-neutral mechanism, just as would be expected from a true gNCC. Treating
recurrent processing as a content mechanism, as Lamme (2020) does, is inconsis-
tent with such inter-domain evidence.
The Integrated InformationTheory of consciousness (IIT; Tononi, 2004; Oizumi
et al., 2014; Tononi et al., 2016) is even less compatible with the gNCC/NCc dis-
tinction. IIT states that both conscious and unconscious processing lead to the
integration of information within the brain. The difference between the two kinds
of processing lies in the degree of integration. If the level of information integra-
tion during perception is too low to change the contents into conscious contents
(clustered in a mental state), perception remains subliminal. A higher degree of
information integration leads to conscious perception. IIT further suggests that a
system with a purely feedforward architecture cannot generate conscious states
(Oizumi et al., 2014, p. 19).
If a feedforward architecture is not enough to turn contents into conscious con-
tents, might not some sort of feedback processing be this additional gNCC mecha-
nism? Although Oizumi et al. (2014) appreciate the value of feedback processing
for visual perception, the answer is no. Feedback processing cannot be the IIT
version of gNCC because even without actual feedback processing a neuronal in-
formational “complex” can be conscious. From the perspective of the theory, the
potential for local interactions among the parts of the complex is more important
for consciousness than actual recurrent processing among its parts (Oizumi et al.,
2014, p. 20); “if all the neurons in a main complex were inactive (or active at a low
baseline rate), they would still generate consciousness as long as they are ready to
respond to incoming spikes” (Oizumi et al., 2014, p. 17).
This is one reason why IIT does not support the gNCC idea. The second one
is that at least on some versions of IIT, perceptual content mechanisms are inex-
tricably interwoven with consciousness-conferring processes. This is the case in
Tsuchiya’s account, for example. Tsuchiya (2017, p. 4) comments on the role of
global availability of information and of recurrent processing in explanations of
conscious perception. These processes, Tsuchiya believes, cannot account for the
phenomenological differences between experiences.
Why does vision feel like vision? Within vision, why does color feel
different from shape, despite both being generated in the visual cor-
tex? Whatever is critical for consciousness should be specific for the
cortico‐thalamic system during the awake and the dreaming state and
should be differentiable in ways that allow us to understand different
modalities and their particular characteristics. (Tsuchiya, 2017, p. 4)
Marvan, T., & Polák, M. (2020). Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural
correlates of perceptual consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II), 5.
https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.II.61
©The author(s). https://philosophymindscience.org ISSN: 2699-0369
Tomáš Marvan and Michal Polák 10
Indeed, recurrent processing is shared among qualitatively different experiences,
and the same holds for the global availability of information (in the GNWT story).
But notice that if the distinction between gNCC and NCc is accepted, explaining
the phenomenological differences between experiences stops being the job of ei-
ther the RPT (on the straightforward reading) or of the GNWT.Their job is merely
to explicate how various perceptual contents become conscious – to describe the
gNCC. The phenomenological questions Tsuchiya raises, although central for the
science of consciousness, must be tackled by a radically different type of a theory.
Finally, no application may be given to the gNCC idea in pure sensory process-
ing theories of consciousness such as in Zeki and Bartels’ theory of essential nodes
(Zeki & Bartels, 1999). The authors claim that some perceptual processing sites in
the visual cortex are at the same time the sites of conscious processing. When
the neural signal reaching these “essential nodes” is sufficiently strong, the nodes
generate a full-blown content of the particular feature that is processed in the site,
such as colour (in the areas V4 and V4α) or motion perception (in V5/MT). At
the same time, a (micro)consciousness for each of these features is produced in the
same node as well. The theory pictures consciousness as disunified at first because
all the distinct visual features of a mental state are processed and made conscious
independently of each other. All this happens within the 500ms after stimulus on-
set (Zeki, 2003) without our noticing it introspectively. The microconsciousnesses
are then bound together to form a unified conscious percept.
Clearly, the unifying mechanism putting the individual contents together can-
not be the gNCC. When it starts its work, consciousness, although distributed and
not yet unified, is already present. Given that no recurrence, feedback or any other
additional mechanism is needed for a piece of perceptual content to become con-
scious, we see no space for a dissociable gNCC in the essential nodes theory. For
a content to become conscious, increased activity within essential node is all that
is needed.
4 Why countenance the gNCC notion?
As the previous selective review shows, some theories support the gNCC idea,
others do not, and still for others it is unclear. It is therefore a matter of dispute
whether a theory of consciousness needs to embrace the gNCC notion. The theo-
ries employing (or at least permitting) the gNCC/NCc distinction, especially AIR
and GNWT, draw on considerable empirical evidence. But so do the rival theories
not supporting the distinction, such as the IIT and the essential nodes theory. In
this section, we want to contribute to the debate on this subject by summarizing
what we see as the two main theoretical advantages of the theories supporting the
distinction between the general neural process of perceptual consciousness and
content-related neural processing.
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Theory of consciousness gNCC mechanism Proponents
Attended intermediate-level 
representation (AIR) theory Yes – gamma synchronies Prinz (2012)
Global neuronal workspace 
theory (GNWT)
Yes – sustained synchronous 
oscillatory activity in the 
neuronal workspace
Dehaene & Changeux (2011)
Sergent & Naccache (2012)
Mashour et al. (2020) 
and many others
Recurrent processing theory 
(RPT) No (?)
Lamme (2020) 
vs Lamme (2003) and (2006)
Information integration theory 
(IIT) No (?)
Tononi (2004) 
Oizumi et al. (2014) 
Tsuchiya (2017)
and many others
Essential nodes theory No Zeki & Bartels (1999)
1
Figure 2: Selected theories of perceptual consciousness and the gNCC
(i) A strength of a theory supporting the gNCC notion is that it allows a mental
state to be fully formed in all its perceptual aspects without becoming conscious.
Perceptual processing is necessary but not sufficient for consciousness. In contrast,
theories such as the essential nodes theory or the IIT claim that perceptual con-
tents become conscious just by being perceptually constituted in a certainway – by
having a sufficiently strong input into the essential node or reaching a sufficiently
high level of information integration. In these theories, perceptual processing is
both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. A problem for the latter family of
theories is that even if the input signals are sufficiently strong, and remain suffi-
ciently stable and distinct, the contents might not become conscious (Cleeremans,
2014; Frith, 2019). Experimental paradigms such as Continuous Flash Suppres-
sion (Faivre et al., 2014; Sterzer et al., 2014) or change blindness (Beck et al., 2001;
Reddy et al., 2006; Simons & Rensink, 2005) allow experimenters to keep percep-
tual processing in place while not letting perceptual contents enter the stream of
consciousness. Perceptual contents are still being constituted and poised for be-
coming conscious; but they do not become conscious.
To take an example, Jiang et al. (2009) used a dichoptic masking paradigm to
measure temporal dynamics of facial information processing. In one of the exper-
iments, the subjects were perceiving a face with neutral expression in two con-
ditions, visible and invisible. In the invisible condition, processing of face-related
attributes was reduced (as documented by a decrease in amplitudes of the ERP com-
ponents). Still, in both conditions, the experimenters recorded a significant simi-
larity of positive (P1) and negative (N1) components of the ERP waveform. (The
compared waveforms started around 220ms after stimulus onset in both visible
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and invisible condition). The authors consider this to be evidence for unconscious
cortical processing of faces in superior temporal sites (Jiang et al., 2009, p. 1176).3
From the perspective of this paper, the most interesting possibility of this sort
is when the perceptual contents mechanisms are functioning well but as a result
of the gNCC itself being disrupted, the contents do not reach consciousness. For
instance, artificial disruption of feedback loops fromMT+/V5 to V1 by transcranial
magnetic stimulation causes loss of visual consciousness of motion (Pascual-Leone
& Walsh, 2001). The gNCC idea provides a simple explanation. Feedback from
higher to lower areas is the gNCC. Disruption of feedback loops from MT+/V5 to
V1 thus amounts to the disruption of gNCC itself. Resulting loss of conscious per-
ception of motion is inevitable even if the processing at perceptual site (MT+/V5)
remains intact. The feedback signals are not participating in perceptual processing
but act as a consciousness conferring mechanism.
Such disruption of the gNCC should be possible – and empirically testable – in
other theories of consciousness supporting the gNCC/NCc distinction. Recall that
gamma synchronisation is the gNCC according to AIR theory. Disrupting it should
stop the stream of colour consciousness even if visual content correlates – the vec-
torwaves – continue to process incoming signals. In fact, Prinz (2015, p. 384) con-
siders this possibility. Vectorwaves can be activatedwithout the content they carry
becoming conscious. Visual contents can be formed unconsciously but fail to reach
awareness if gamma synchronization fails. When a particular neuronal population
fires out of synchrony, we may perceive blue but only unconsciously. Similarly,
according to the GNWT, the long-range axonal connections between prefrontal
and parieto-temporal cortex secure wide distribution of sensory contents. Dis-
rupting these long-range connections (i.e., disrupting the GNWT’s gNCC) should
disrupt conscious perception. Meanwhile, the sensory areas processing visual and
other stimuli can still be working; processing in the sensory areas can go deep and
significantly influence behaviour even when the signals ultimately do not reach
consciousness (Dehaene et al., 1998; Dehaene, 2014; Sergent et al., 2005). Again,
sensory contents could be completely processed at the perceptual level while not
entering into conscious stream.4
(ii) Being strict about keeping the processing of perceptual contents apart
from consciousness-related processing in one’s theory is also an important pre-
3It has to be noted that the extent of unconscious processing under various experimental paradigms
is the subject of ongoing controversy. In particular, while there is a general agreement that lower
level visual features such as stimulus orientation can be perceived unconsciously under Contin-
uous Flash Suppression, unconscious perception of higher-level features, such as face identity or
facial expression, was not demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. For the most comprehensive
recent review of Continuous Flash Suppression studies, and the controversies surrounding the
results, see Pournaghdali & Schwartz (2020).
4The signals in sensory areas during unconscious processing are weaker then during conscious
processing. This does not contradict our hypothesis. The weakening of the signals in unconscious
conditions could be explained by the absence of the gNCC activation. For more details, (see Mar-
van & Polák, 2017).
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requisite for building a truly general, pan-modality theory of conscious percep-
tion. Although most of the theories of consciousness are applied to visual data,
this limitation must be overcome. It would be desirable to have a systematic and
unifying theory of what makes visual, auditory, gustatory and other forms of con-
tents conscious. The gNCC idea is a perfect match for this ambitious project, being
completely modality-neutral.
Of the theories discussed in the previous section 3, the GNWT is already formu-
lated in a domain-general way. The neuronal workspace globally distributes visual,
auditory, tactile or olfactory contents (Dehaene, 2014, pp. 13, 119–120, 158, 217,
and 221). There is no specialized gNCC for vision, distinct from gNCC for audition
etc.5 Unfortunately, there are almost no other attempts to identify a shared gNCC
in different sensory modalities. Apart from the promising visual-tactile compari-
son studymentioned in section 3 (Auksztulewicz et al., 2012), initial comparisons of
visual and auditory correlates of conscious perception were performed by Snyder
et al. (2015). According to them, auditory Awareness-Related Negativity, a hypoth-
esized marker of conscious hearing, is the auditory analogue of the Visual Aware-
ness Negativity, a presumed signature of arising visual consciousness. Awareness-
Related Negativity typically peaks around 100ms after the stimulus onset, Visual
Awareness Negativity around 50–100ms later. Both negativities consistently show
up in EEG and MEG studies of conscious perception in both domains, displaying
robust invariance under different experimental paradigms and changing task de-
mands. This is not just an interesting result in its own right, but indirectly points to
the role of recurrent processing, which is often taken to be the correlate of Visual
Awareness Negativity (see Förster et al., 2020). Recurrent processing theories of
consciousness (such as the RPT in the straightforward reading) thus gain further
evidential support.
More comparative inter-modality research will show whether the results gen-
eralize and vindicate the idea of a unique gNCCmechanism. The guiding principle
of any such research must be to carefully disentangle the presumed gNCC process
from an almost indefinite variety of content endowing mechanisms. In the words
of Snyder and colleagues:
Paradigms designed to isolate neural correlates of the contents of con-
sciousness are likely to find different neuroanatomical sources for au-
ditory versus visual NCCs. By contrast, studies that are able to isolate
neural mechanisms that bring these contents into awareness, which
may be a distinct process, could reveal overlapping neural sources be-
tween auditory and visual modalities. (Snyder et al., 2015, p. 296)
The only difference between this view and our proposal is that we do not insist on
literally the same neurophysiological resources of consciousness-conferring mech-
5In fact, GNWT has even broader ambitions in some of its formulations. Influential GNW theorists
claim that the workspace idea can be extended to “felt emotions, visual imagery, working memory,
and executive control” (Baars et al., 2013).
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anism being deployed in different modalities. This would indeed be the case of
GNWTwhere different ignitions of the global workspace may literally use overlap-
ping neuronal coalitions to broadcast contents from different sensory modalities.
But this is not required for a gNCC. What matters is merely that the same type of
neural mechanism is deployed across perceptual episodes in different modalities.
The gNCC mechanism for different modalities may be localized non-overlapping
areas. In fact, this is the picture behind AIR. The theory would probably locate
gamma synchronies in different dedicated sensory cortices for different modali-
ties – in the visual cortex for conscious vision, in the auditory cortex for conscious
audition etc.6
5 Concluding remarks
While the search for neural correlates of conscious perception is an empirical enter-
prise, it benefits from theoretical-conceptual and methodological reflections. The
hypothesis put forward in this article is that the standard notion of perceptual
NCC conflates the processing of perceptual contents with consciousness confer-
ring mechanisms. Whereas the content mechanisms (NCc) secure all the richness
of experience, gNCC is a content-free, domain-neutral mechanism. The resulting
neural correlate of a specific type of experienced content (NCcc) arises in the dy-
namic interaction between these two distinct types of processes.
Although we propose a revision of the content-based NCC concept, the pro-
posal is motivated by theoretical and empirical considerations and does not have
the form of a conceptual truth. Consequently, our goal in this paper was modest:
to open the discussion on the possibility of the gNCC/NCc distinction and to mar-
shal some of the initial arguments in its favour. In the remainder, let us point out
two advantages of endorsing it.
First, the theories supporting the gNCC/NCc distinction are amenable to direct
testing in terms of the hypothesized gNCC. If during testing the presumed gNCC
is either detected in conditions of subliminal perception, or if conscious percep-
tion occurs in the absence of the gNCC, the tested theory is deficient.7 On the
other hand, evidence against the gNCC according to a particular theory does not
disqualify the gNCC idea as such. The gNCC might be implemented elsewhere in
the brain, or in a different way altogether.
Secondly, the gNCC/NCc distinction helps to appreciate that tracing the con-
tent mechanisms and elucidating how they work may be a different project from
6We say “would probably locate” because Prinz (2012) does not extend his gamma synchrony theory
to non-visual modalities.
7For the first possibility see, e.g., the GNWT-contradicting evidence in Silverstein et al. (2015) that
P3b, an ERP index of workspace ignition (Dehaene et al., 2003), may be present under rigorously
subliminal conditions. For the second possibility, see the AIR-contradicting evidence that increase
in local gamma synchronisation might not be sufficient for conscious face perception in Aru et
al. (2012).
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the effort to isolate the general mechanism by which the contents are made con-
scious. In our estimate, the first of the two research projects will be much more
difficult to carry through. The questions falling to the content side belong to the
most vexing issues of the science of consciousness. Why are perceptual contents
constituted in one way and not another? Why does hearing the sound of trum-
pet feel so different from smelling fresh strawberries, given the similarity of the
underlying neural processing in both cases? Where are the contents located? Do
only striate and extrastriate areas have the neural resources to express the visual
contents down to their very fine details, or may these contents be expressed else-
where in the brain? Are the consciously experienced contents the very same as
those formed unconsciously? Or is the activity in sensory areas a necessary pre-
requisite but not a proper neural substrate of conscious perception? In comparison
with these riddles, the search for the gNCC may turn out to be a more manageable
enterprise. As the proposals discussed in section 3 indicate, the gNCC could be a
mechanism having the role of boosting or distributing the sensory signals.
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